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21. Introduction
Economists think about reality in terms of markets1. In practice, a market is just an
abstraction, and drawing the limits of markets out of actual information is a difficult
task, that has different answers depending on the objectives of the analysis we want to
perform (strategy formulation, competition policy, industrial organization). It is not very
common to have the opportunity of studying a process by which some well
differentiated markets are transformed into new ones, because of changes in the
technology and the demand that cause the products or services of the original markets to
end up by serving identical needs to the same customers. In such a situation, firms are
faced with big opportunities and big potential drawbacks. Those that are able to
correctly foresee the future developments can gain an important headstart and position
themselves so as to obtain an important competitive advantage. On the other hand,
making irreversible investments in the wrong technology can seriously threaten the
competitive position of a firm.
In this paper, we study the so-called technological convergence, a process by
which the telecommunications, broadcasting, information technologies and
entertainment sectors (collectively known as ICT–Information and Communications
Technologies) may be converging towards a unified market. Actually, one of the first
questions we consider is how accurate this convergence forecast is. But, whether or not
a unique market results in the end, it is clear that those sectors are involved in the kind
of process we described above, by which old markets change to give rise to new ones.
Our aim is to study the determinants of the firms’ strategies. Many interesting
phenomena are taking place within the domain we consider. For instance, we could
analyze many interesting case studies to consider the old strategic controversy about the
conditions under which firms should vertically integrate or consider some alternative
like joint ventures or strategic alliances. Actually, the process of mergers and alliances
is so fast that any attempt we made at describing it would necessarily be outdated by the
time this paper is read. What we do in this paper is to describe the underlying
technological and economic factors that influence the firms’ choice of strategies.
Technological convergence is possible because of a confluence of technological and
economic factors. On the technological side, the key factor is the evolution of
communications and information technologies. On the economic side, the most
important factor is the worldwide liberalization of the telecommunications markets.
When making strategic decisions, firms take into account the environment, but
when the uncertainty associated is very high, making accurate expectations becomes
very difficult. Some firms try to influence the future developments. For instance, the
investments of Microsoft in the cable industry may be interpreted as an intention to
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3position its Windows CE software as a key element in the set-top-boxes for digital
television. The establishment of alliances which is taking place in the ICT illustrates
very well how the participants are trying to position themselves in the market. There are
many reasons behind the changing nature of competition in the ICT. These are: the need
to cope with technological uncertainty (trying to impose a standard), market uncertainty
(create demand with the supply of content and get the rents where margins are higher)
and huge investments (the need of complementary resources).
Before making a more accurate analysis, it is important to point out which have
been the driving forces of the big changes in the industry. In the first place, the
possibility of digitizing all type of signals has given rise to technological convergence,
which has implications both for the supply (merging of different sectors that were
previously separated) and the demand. In the second place, the costs of voice and data
transmission have experienced a remarkable decrease. This reduction has been made
possible thanks to an improvement in compression techniques, and the reduction in the
costs of infrastructures. The increased efficiency of data delivery was one of the factors
that influenced the decision by governments to change the monopolistic structure of the
old Public Telecommunications Operators (PTOs, nowadays just TOs), engaging in a
worlwide process of liberalization that started in 1998. Market dominance and high
fixed costs have caused TOs to engage in a process of mergers, acquisitions and
alliances. The arguments behind this agreements can be explained by two main reasons:
to get the economies of scale needed to maintain profitability (horizontal co-operation);
or looking for those steps in the value chain which can offer bigger profit margins
(vertical co-operation).
By technological convergence is meant that any type of terminal can access any
type of data, which in turn is able to be transmitted through any kind of pipe. Internet
has been the catalyst of this process. The technology that has been responsible for
platform-independence in the Internet is the IP protocol, which is the basis of a set of
protocols that allow routing and transmitting any kind of data (text, image, and voice).
Convergence has implications both for demand and supply. First, businesses and home
users may have access to a lot of information in an interactive way using any type of
terminal. Second, information that is transmitted is platform-independent. This means
that there are several alternatives to transmit a given content. For instance, it is possible
(or will be in the near future) to obtain local phone connection through the traditional
copper wire, wireless, cable or television antennae. It is expected that in a few years just
digital data will circulate through the pipes. Some of these data will be telephony voice
(which requires low bandwidth), but other content, like digital films, will require more
transmission capacity. But many problems must be solved; for instance, the current
copper networks, which are the main asset of the TOs, are not wide enough to carry the
bulk of information that is needed to broadcast a film. Hence, a telecommunications
operator that wants to compete with, say, a cable company, must make the necessary
infrastructure upgrades to provide broadband services. But problems may arise because
neither the new technology nor the market may be mature enough. When will the
demand size allow the firm to recoup the money? Besides, how will this demand be? If
the services provided are close to a competitor’s offer, consumers will choose the
4solution that fits their budgets best. So, it is difficult to bet on a concrete technology
when the most popular uses of that technology are not clear yet. Leaving the demand
aside, who can tell that the investment that is made today will not be obsolete tomorrow
because a more cost-effective technology has appeared? In the next sections we will
elaborate all of these aspects.
All the changes mentioned above have shaped the landscape in the transmission
activities. On the one hand, there are a lot of opportunities for all the agents involved
because the markets are growing. But on the other hand, the competition has widened
because there are more technological alternatives to satisfy the same demand. The
technological changes provide opportunities for firms, but also imply big risks. In order
to understand the opportunities and risks that have arisen in the ICT sectors, in section 2
we make a brief survey of what is technological convergence and which are its
consequences, for both the supply and demand sides. In section 2.1, we provide a small
description of infrastructures capable of supplying information. In section 3, we take
into consideration the factors that must be carefully weighed when launching a product
to the market, and use some examples to illustrate them. In section 4, we focus on the
demand side of the technological convergence. Are the users ready for technological
convergence? As an early indicator we use some data published by the ISPO on the
Information Society. Essentially, the question we pose is whether there is a real
convergence between television and Internet consumers. In section 5, we analyze the
determinants of the firms’ strategies. In section 6, we present some conclusions and
avenues for further research.
2. Technological convergence today
Technological convergence has both a technical and a functional side. The technical
side refers to the ability of any infrastructure to transport any type of data, while
functional side means the consumers may be able to integrate in a seamless way the
functions of computation, entertainment, and voice in a unique device able to execute a
multiplicity of tasks. The European Commission, in its Green Paper on Technological
Convergence (1997), illustrates this idea and defines technological convergence as:
“The ability of different network platforms to carry essentially similar kinds
of services, or
The coming together of consumer devices such as the telephone, television
and personal computer.”
The convergence affects those industries that are concerned with the delivery of
data and content, as well as those that take care their displaying, and will affect their
market power because, as already noted, it implies the merging of different markets. We
show our idea in Table 1.
5According  to Table 1, technological convergence means that consumers have the
capacity to access any kind of contents using any type of terminal (be it the PC, the
mobile telephone or the television, for instance). This could imply that any telephone
operator would have the ability to provide video services to its clients, or that a
broadcasting company could give access to the Internet using the TV –without the need
to use the telephone to send data outside. Taking another focus, this could mean that
anyone could shop in the World Wide Web through a television set or on the other way
around, watch a TV program using its PC. Let us assume that the market is ready for
this technological convergence: does this imply that the firms technologically ready?
Many sources of
infrastructure provision
Many
Services
Many
Terminals
 Over the air:
 Terrestrial
 Satellite
 Mobile
communications
(WAP, GPRS,
UMTS…)
 Wired:
 Telecommunications
 Coaxial Cable
(CATV)
 Physically-Delivered:
 Tape (VCR)
 Laser Disk
 Digital Video Disk
(DVD)
 Telephone service:
 Local
 Long Distance
 Data provisioning
 Dedicated lines
(LANs, WANs)
 Internet access
 Content provisioning
 VOD
 NVOD
 Information Services
 TV Receiver:
 Conventional
 Home Theatre
 Set-Top Box:
 CATV converter
 DBS decoder
 Player/Recorder:
 VCR
 Disk Player
 Personal Computer
Table 1: The implications of convergence
Source: Adapted from Noll (1999) and Towndsed (1997)
A Business Week article (Wildstrom, 2000) discusses to what extent can
nowadays the convergence between television and Internet be considered a superior
option to the conventional television. Its author tried a satellite TV with access to the
Internet, and he thinks that, from a technological standpoint, the convergence has still a
long way to go. Even though the quality of satellite TV was higher than any current
cable system, the Internet navigation system was clumsy, as compared to the navigators
usually used on PCs. The mail system was also found defective. The results of his
experience can be summarized in the following quote:
6“Deadly wait. A big handicap for interactive TV and other WebTV Internet
services is that they rely on dial-up connections. By the time I waited a couple of
minutes to establish a connection, I often forgot what I wanted to interact with.
Similarly, waiting several minutes for a response to a click on a movie’s Web link
is painful. This would work a lot better if WebTV were paired with a two-way
cable system rather than the inherently one-way satellite TV. Unfortunately, that’s
not an option now.”
In summary, there are various issues that should be considered in this process of
convergence. The Digital TV (DTV) will imply the coming together of several devices
such as television, PCs or telephones2, but as of now the technological convergence has
yet to arrive. On the supply side, neither the terminal equipment nor the transmission
infrastructures are still well prepared to provide broadband video and switched data
service (Owen, 1999).  Besides, the present television sets are not able to deal with the
storage and processing capabilities of the computer world, nor have they the
functionality of a PC navigation tool. And, if TV sets were ready to get the user into the
World Wide Web, would their static appearance appeal to consumers compared to the
more dynamic TV advertisements?. And, on the demand side, consumers do not seem
very aware of what technological convergence means –except for some segments. Noll
(1999) studies the failure introduction of the High Definition Television (HDTV). He
discusses the fact that yet in the early eighties HDTV seemed to be the television of the
nineties, but at the beginning of the new millennium the future of the HDTV remains
uncertain. He uses some examples to illustrate that the market was not ready for the
interactive television yet; we use some of this material in the next section.
2.1.  Considering alternatives for data transmission
The final effect that the technological convergence will have on the different firms will
be conditioned by market, technological and regulatory issues. It has been pointed out
(Townsend, 1997; EC, 1997) that the ultimate outcome will be strongly influenced by
whether the governments and international institutions are able to set up a regulatory
framework that establishes neutral conditions intended to promote fair competition. In
this subsection, we concentrate on the technological alternatives to provide broadband
interactivity to the homes. Even though we recognize that technology itself may not be
the deciding factor, regulatory aspects are not treated in this section.
Traditionally, TOs have enjoyed the monopoly of voice telephony. The digital
revolution and the liberalization of markets have lowered barriers to entry, allowing
new players to enter the market. As a natural consequence, TOs have to fight price
competition in their traditional core markets from others–basically foreign TOs seeking
                                                          
2 Although it could be said that the great advantage of the DTV lies in its better display quality, it has
been said often that its great appeal is the interactivity it can offer (Noll, 1999).
7to broaden their market, and also cable operators. Although voice telephony still enjoys
a good health, sooner or later these markets will become mature. This fact is pushing
these antique gods to enter the entertainment market as a good prospect to maintaining
their profitability in the long-term. Cable operators represent the new competition for
TOs, especially in those countries where these operators are allowed to provide voice
telephony. They are experiencing a situation similar to the one just described for the
TOS, in the sense that they are facing competition from satellite broadcasters vying for
consumers’ attention, with a market that is becoming increasingly saturated. To
challenge their competitors, cable companies are trying to offer more options to their
subscribers (high-speed Internet access, telephony and conventional TV3), but cable
operators can’t embody all these offerings in their actual pipes for free.
There are various generic media for transmitting signals under development, as
noted in Table 1, which are grappling to provide television. In this section, we only
make a description of wired infrastructures in order to elucidate the risks faced by
telecommunications and cable firms, and discuss some intermediate solutions adopted
by them. Each delivery system has advantages and suffers handicaps, and it is not clear,
especially because issues about demand are still so confusing, that any of them is
dominating the others. Traditionally, the broadcasting of radio or television signals
(wired or wireless) was in essence a broadband, one-way communication.  On the other
hand, telephone (be it wired or wireless) is a two-way narrowband communication.  The
meaning of this is that if some interactivity is to be permitted (in the case of the TV
broadcasters) or wider bandwidth is to be provided, then some network enhancements
must be made.
Wired infrastructures are the twisted-pair copper wires, which are the main
telecommunications operators’ asset, and the coaxial cables owned by the cable
operators (CATV4).  The similarities between these two transmission media are
basically that both of them have a tree and branch structure5, but a CATV resembles
more a wireless broadcasting medium in the sense that the information is one way (with
the difference that the CATV is able to provide multiple channels). Because the use of
the main lines -trunk technologies- is spread across a lot of users, they used to be
broadbandcoaxial cable, radio towers that transmit microwave signals,
communication satellites or fibre optic. These broadband infrastructures are expensive,
and since the liberalization of the telecommunications markets the necessary investment
has increased substantially. Although these trunk technologies could be used in the local
loop, it doesn’t seem that it would be economically profitable, given the current levels
of demand. It is plausible that in the long-term the demand will shift from conventional
to interactive television but, at the moment, guessing the momentum is just a
                                                          
3 This bundle is what is generally acknowledged as the one-stop-shopping
4 The acronym CATV corresponds to Collective Antennae Television used in the fifties in the U.S.A. to
enhance the TV broadcasting in the farthest rural areas.
5 A tree and branch structure is like a highway (the main or trunk lines) that supports the big bulk of
traffic and the local roads (the local loop) that delivers the traffic to the particular homes. The
computers which are in charge of driving this traffic are the switches in the case of the
telecommunications operators and the headends in the case of the CATV operators.
8speculation. This is the chief argument that explains the intermediate solutions adopted
by firms, which are spelt out in the next paragraphs.
 Telephone lines, which were initially designed to transmit voice, are inadequate
to transmit the great quantity of information that high-speed data or multimedia services
need. For this reason, telephone engineers have been working on software solutions that
offer the possibility to use the traditional copper wires as high-speed lines. This is the
DSL technology (Digital subscriber Line). The DSL technology comprises a set of
modems at both ends of the pipe, which compress the data. There are various types of
DSL modems, being the most popular currently the ADSL (Asymmetric Digital
Subscriber Line). The term Asymmetric means that the speeds of the downstream data
(going to the user) are higher than the upstream (going out) data. As a result, the ADSL
technology may be a good solution for some functions that can support this asymmetry,
like surfing across the World Wide Web or sending an e-mail, but is not so convenient
for telephone calls or videoconferencing.
Telephone companies hold a good position to compete with other alternatives:
firstly, they have the advantage of accessing a larger customer base than cable
companies, and secondly, they are cash-rich companies. On the other hand, in order to
install ADSL the switching station must be located near the consumer if the latter wants
to reliably operate with an ADSL line. This implies the need of higher investments by
the telephone companies, because fibre-optic links must be lengthened to the local
loops. Nevertheless, it is better to invest on equipment than on the network itself, since
the investment can be easily shared with the consumers (Owen, 1999).
Cable television operators come from a broadcasting tradition, in the sense that
their pipes are one-way broadband transmission. The challenge for them is not to
enlarge their capacity but to provide interactivity. To overcome this, there are two
proposed solutions. The first one is to install a one-way cable modem. In this case, the
system relies on a cable modem that uses the cable network for downstream data and
the telephone network to send data outside; the customer must get an extra phone line,
an analogue modem and a cable modem as well. Although this alternative is clearly
inferior to the DSL proposed by telephone operators, it allows cable operators to reduce
costs and risks, because the customer must undertake most of the investment.
Another choice for cable operators is the installation of two-way cable modems.
This alternative uses the coaxial cable both for upstream and downstream data. This is a
more expensive solution, because the same pipe must sustain more traffic. In
consequence, the cable operators should reduce the number of subscribers at each node,
add equipment or upgrade the system as a whole. Any of these possibilities increase the
break-even point.
To examine the different alternatives that are available nowadays, a comparison
has been made among the time it would take for a user to send or receive 650 Mbytes
(the information contained in a CD-ROM). In order to establish similar criteria to judge
the differences, congestion problems have been disregarded, so it must be understood
that the used transmission speeds are theoretical in each case. We have not taken into
account, either, whether the different connections guarantee a minimum bandwidth,
9although this is a requirement to allow the PC confirm that packets have arrived to their
destination. Also, the possible “hang-ups” have been ignored.
From Table 2 it is easy to see that a universal network for managing the variable
bandwidth transfers in real time needed for the new applications does not exist yet. The
different choices are more suitable for receiving than for sending information.  The
consequence is that some services that require high downstream transmission speed,
like the reception of software, films or music, are clearly benefited.  Instead, having a
videoconference, which requires a high bandwidth both for the delivery and the
reception of data, is more problematic. The two-way 27 Mbps cable modem
connections are the ones that perform best but, at the moment, their availability in the
markets is limited. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that cable seems a better alternative
than the DSL in offering high-speed, there are other points that should be considered in
weighting the advantages and disadvantages of the different technologies. While the
coaxial cable permits higher Internet speeds, the DSL is more consistent and safer to
hackers’ attacks. This is because the DSL is a dedicated telephone line, while the
coaxial cable is a shared platform, which suffers from congestion at peak hours.
The most ambitious view of the technological convergence promises to provide
full interactivity to the homes (VOD, NVOD, telephony and so on). There are different
alternatives competing for the prize, and the winner will not necessarily be the one that
performs best, but the one more favoured by the customers. There are some warnings
about how regulatory aspects should adapt in order to prevent market failures
(Blackman, 1998; Parker, 1999; Townsed, 1997). A desirable outcome in the
technological war would be the coexistence of the different alternatives to allow home
access. The choice would depend on the intended usage and the costs of the competing
alternatives. But there are more pessimistic views that argue that allowing the joint
provision of voice telephony and data by telecommunications and cable operators could
reinforce the incumbents’ power and hinder innovation. The reason is that TOs are
much larger than their cable competitors and, as a consequence, so is their borrowing
capacity.
In the next section, we present a framework that identifies the factors underlying
the risks in the ICT markets. The framework should be useful to understand the
volatility of the technological firms’ shares. Uncertainties about policies and regulation
interact with uncertainty about demand and technology. In Parker’s (1999) words,
“technological invention is the precondition, but by no means the guarantee, of the
market’s embrace”.
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Transmission Speed Transmission Time
Downstream Upstream Downstream Upstream
POTS
(analogue
28,8 Kbps 28,8 Kbps 50h 9m 15s 50h 9m 15s
Voice
telephony)
33,6 Kbps 33,6 Kbps 42h 59m 21s 42h 59m 21s
1997 56 Kbps 56 Kbps 25h 47m 37s 25h 47m 37s
ISDN 64 Kbps 64 Kbps 22h 34m 11s 22h 34m 11s
128 Kbps 128 Kbps 11h 17m 4s 11h 17m 4s
xDSL (SDSL) 384 Kbps 384 Kbps 3h 45m 41s 3h 45m 41s
(HDSL) 768 Kbps 768 Kbps 1h 52m 50s 1h 52m 50s
(ADSL) 1,5 Mbps 12 Kbps 57m 46s 120h 22m 13s
(ADSL) 8 Mbps 500 Kbps 10m 49s 2h 53m 19s
Cable modems 1,2 Mbps 128 Kbps 1h 12m 13s 11h 17m 4s
27 Mbps 10 Mbps 3m 12s 8m 39s
POTS line
used for
25h 47m 37s
upstream
Wireless (900 Mhz) 28,8 Kbps 28,8 Kbps 50h 9m 15s 50h 9m 15s
(LMDS) 1,5 Mbps 1,5 Mbps 57m 46s 57m 46s
(MMDS) 1,5 Mbps 1,5 Mbps 57m 46s 57m 46s
Satellite (Direct
PC)
400 Kbps POTS line
used for
sending
3h 36m 39s 25h 47m 37s
outside
Table 2: Waiting time for sending or receiving a CD using the different
alternatives that provide access to the Internet6.
Source: Elaborated with data from Owen (1999), pg. 194.
                                                          
6 It must be said here that the speeds in the table are only potential. In Catalonia, for instance, ADSL goes
from 256 Kbps to a maximum of 2-4 Mbps.
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3. Potential sources of uncertainty
After ten years of risky and expensive investments, in 23 September 1998, the Iridium7
consortium launched its first low-orbit satellite, with the aim of allowing connection by
users on any part of the planet. Although forecasts were very optimistic, and the project
counted with the advantage of being the kind running8, about two years later the firm
went into bankruptcy. The failure9 of the project is related to wrong market forecasts
and problems in commercialization because, according to experts, the idea was fantastic
in the technological sense. Supposedly, the bulk of its potential clients were business
people who travel all over the world  (besides other small groups like adventurers,
mountain climbers or scientists who travel to remote places), but Iridium found that, by
the time the product appeared in the market, these potential clients already had more
convenient alternatives, which gave coverage in their more frequent destinations. No
doubt the initial market studies showed that the project was profitable, but the problem
lies in the fact that those studies did not take into account the developments in mobile
telephony that took place while the project was being developed.
This case reflects the technological and market uncertainties marketing people
must cope with when making forecasts. Besides, in emergent and technology-intensive
sectors, the right moment of entering the market is a critical decision. When they were
launched, the Iridium devices had been displaced (entered the market late), because the
GSM mobile systems were already satisfying the demand at a much lower cost and with
more adequate (smaller) devices. The adoption of GSM as a standard by the European
Union in 1992 is behind the explosion of the mobile phone market in Europe. It
diminished technological uncertainty both for users and suppliers. Competition in the
GSM phone market led to enhancements in the technology that resulted in cheaper,
lighter and smaller devices, and besides, in a wider coverage.
On the contrary, the size of the terminals provided by Iridum and the cost users
must bear, both for the acquisition of the terminal and for each call, were too high
compared to the alternatives.  The cost of the Iridum terminals was much larger than the
cost of a mobile phone, and they weighed half a kilo. Also, the price of each call was
way above the price for mobile phones. The market size of Iridium has not gone further
than 55,000 clients for all the world, which proved insufficient to recoup an investment
of between 5,000 and 7,000 million US dollars, the annual costs of maintenance and the
financial expenditures derived from the huge debts contracted.
According to Shanklin and Ryans (1988), high technology markets can be
technology-driven (radical innovations) or demand-driven (incremental innovations). In
the first case, the product is based on presumed rather than identified needs. For
instance, the changes occurred in the ICT markets are a consequence of the emergence
                                                          
7 Backed by Motorola.
8 Other global satellite network projects like Globalstar, backed by Loral Space Systems or Teledesic,
among whose main shareholders is Bill Gates, promised to compete fiercely for a total market that
experts estimated to reach the $8,5 billion in 2002.
9 “El pesimismo invade la telefonía por satélite”. Ciberp@ís, march 30th 2000.
12
of new ways to transmit the information, which is finally the outcome of technological
innovation. A secondary factor in the development of these markets is the demand,
which is later developed. Finally, the change in the regulatory framework is only an
intention to give answer to all of these transformations. It is clear that in these emergent
sectors the role of the technology is fundamental and it is a key element in the strategy
of the firms (Foster, 1988; Grant, 1995, Chapters 9 and 10). Though the potential
benefits in the emergent sectors are enormous, they are very hazardous as well. An
explanation of the volatility of these markets can be found in Grant (1995), who makes
a decomposition of the risks associated with technology-intensive products. First, the
lack of knowledge about the likely size of the market; second, the evolution of the
technology itself; and, finally, the difficulty of making predictions about the nature of
the demand–for instance, what will be the more conventional uses of the product.
In the following paragraphs, we describe the risks associated to technological
products that derive from discontinuous innovations. As noted in the section before,
there is a variety of infrastructures that provide broadband-interactive access. Guessing
which is the most cost-effective technological solution is difficult when consumer
demand is not clear; firms have uncertainties regarding both the size and the
characteristics of the demand.
3.1. Market uncertainty
In a changing environment, firms must reconsider their product mix continuously. This
entails abandoning old products, modifying existing ones, and making new launchings.
The last two actions involve innovations. The risks associated with new or improved
products originate in technological or market uncertainties. We are concerned in this
section with market uncertainties. In the launching of any new product (be it a radical or
an incremental innovation) there is never certainty about the consumers’ reaction to it.
The problem is more acute when the product is too novel and requires a high level of
effort to induce consumers to switch to it.  Firms try to reduce this risk by conducting
systematic studies before entrusting large sums of money to new product releases.
These are, typically, concept testing, product testing, and market testing. The chief
objective of concept testing is to render more precise earlier ideas before devoting the
firm’s wealth to any prototype. Moore (1988) points out that, in general, concept
testings are more suitable for modifications of products (incremental innovations) than
for radical new products. The reason is that the consumers’ lack of familiarity with
radical innovations, and the absence of other external factors, like social influences, that
affect consumers’ behaviour, make concept testing fruitless in predicting market
success. For this reason, it has been said before that radical innovations are based upon
presumed needs, because in fact consumers are not the best judges in evaluating new
products (Foster, 1988; Moore, 1988). According to this argument, when consumers
lack information and education about the product, they have a marked tendency to reject
it.
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Once the product concept has been developed, and the firm has decided to commit
funds into the new venture, it is time to organize the whole process and make
predictions. This requires a degree of forecasting and projection into the future to turn
R&D programmes into profit. The first problem appears in trying to forecast the level of
sales. “When” and “how many users” will adopt a particular product weigh heavily in
determining the moment in which the profit objectives will be reached. However, the
future development of the demand is difficult to predict with a radical new product
(Moore, 1988; Foster, 1988), basically because no historical data is available and, as
mentioned earlier, consumers lack familiarity with the product. We quote some
examples that illustrate those problems.
The I.T.U. (1995) explains how Bell Atlantic failed in his expectations to supply
interactive television in 199510. The company expected to have 1,2 million homes
subscribed at the beginning of that year, but at the end of the year the number of
subscribers was zero.
Noll (1999) reports two examples more, one from the telecommunications
industry and the other from the computer industry. The author explains how in the mid
eighties, AT&T made some trials in order to grant its customers interaction with their
televisions via Videotext. Videotext allowed users to access information through the
television using a telephone line. The project failed because its users complained that
the system interfered with their watching TV programmes.
Microsoft made a new attempt in that direction in the nineties. With a 40% PC
home market penetration, Microsoft spent $1 billion in the acquisition and promotion of
WebTV with the intention of integrating the TV and the PC. After spending about $50
million in advertising during the 1996 winter holidays, WebTV and its allies –Sony and
Philips Electronics– only reached 50,000 subscriptions, much below forecasts.
According to Judge (1998), Microsoft would have found useful to wonder why 60% of
homes did not have a PC yet. This author suggests that behind those failures there is
marketing myopia by the firms, who have not been able to understand the differences
between TV fanatics and Web fanatics.
Those three examples serve us to draw some preliminary conclusions. Consumer
habits are not easy to change, and the market needs time to be educated.  Following this
idea, some analysts discuss the fact that a menu-driven television can substitute, at least
in the short term, the conventional television (be it free or not), and as of now it seems
more appropriate to bet on a monolithic television, although with more channels. As
with any radical innovation, it does not seem that this transition may take place
overnight.
We end this subsection with a quotation that illustrates the phenomenon of market
uncertainty for new products:
“The newer and more innovative a product is, the more likely it is that the
public might not appreciate it at the beginning. In 1952, our company marketed a
tape recorder. Despite the fact that it was a great achievement and a technological
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innovation for us, at the time it looked like a toy to the general public. Nobody
thought about recording speeches or using a tape recorder to learn languages…. In
the case of an entirely new product, a market must be created”11
3.2. Technological uncertainty
In section 2.1 we have made a revision of wired infrastructures that are competing for
the home market. It is quite likely that, by the time this paper appears in print, that
information will be outdated. This is nothing more than a manifestation of technological
uncertainty, which is characteristic of any disruptive innovation.
The Product Life Cycle (PLC) has been a useful tool for economists in explaining
the evolution of markets and how firms’ strategies adapt (Grant, 1995; Moore and
Koprince, 1999; Teece, 1988). Four phases are distinguished in the PLC: an
introductory phase, growth, maturity and decline. PLC analysis can be applied in many
instances (from a particular trademark to a brand new market). Our starting point here is
a disruptive innovation, which gives rise to a different technological paradigm, but we
also consider incremental innovations that are based on established technologies. The
introductory phase is the most uncertain, because of the technology itself, and also
because many issues about compatibility with current consumer habits are only based
on presumptions, as we commented in section 3.1.
From the standpoint of the supply, a big source of uncertainty is related with the
issue of standardization. Sometimes, one among all competing products will end up
becoming a de facto standard. In other (rarer) instances, a de iure standard (imposed by
governments or public institutions) will appear. Strongly related with standardization is
the issue of compatibility among different products.
In the introductory phase of the product, there are many technological alternatives
and configurations available vying to emerge as a dominant design. The growth of the
market may be favoured by the emergence of a paradigm design that allows the better
quality/price performing ratios. When such designs become de facto standards, the
market will be dominated by a small handful of companies who have control over the
products’ architecture, so other vendors and suppliers are submitted to their
requirements. Similar patterns of behaviour are found in markets for network products,
like the VCR market (Cusumano, 1992) and the PC industry (Langlois, 1992). In both
cases, firms entrenched their leadership in the industry by establishing their own designs
as the successful ones taking advantage of indirect network externalities.
There is a vast literature on this type of emergent markets and the role played by
the standards12 when network externalities are present13. There are different sources of
                                                          
11 Morita, Akio (1981). “Creativity in Modern Industry”, Komn, K March 1981, p. 6. Cited in Shanklin,
William; Ryans, Johnk K. Jr. (1988)
12 We refer here to the interface standards or compatibility standards.
13 On this regard, one can consult David and Greenstein (1990).
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network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). First, direct network externalities, in
which the utility function of a user increases when there are more people using that
product (communication technologies are a typical example). In this sense, standards
play a critical role in the expansion of the market because they affect positively the
quality of the product. Second, the so-called indirect network externalities, which have
their origin in the variety and quantity of complementary products (the well known case
of software and add-ons for PCs). Finally, the expanse of the installed base of customers
has a positive effect on the quality and availability of after-sale services. There are
several case studies that analyze standardization processes under a strategic
perspective14. An example is the well-known battle of standards in the video recorders
market. Cusumano (1992) explains the failure of Sony in the launching of its Betamax.
The author argues that Sony, who had too much confidence in its reputation and relied
excessively on the superior quality of its product, was reluctant to share its technology.
On the contrary, JVC licensed the technology to other manufacturers, and this
encouraged the suppliers of contents to use JVC’s standard. The creation of
complementary resources (for instance, more availability of films in VHS than in Beta
format) and direct network externalities played a crucial role in favour of the VHS
system, which in the end almost completely displaced Sony’s Betamax.
In technology-intensive sectors in which network externalities are present, the
imposition of a technology as a de facto standard may displace the technologies that are
not dominant. In the World Telecommunications Development Report (WTDR) of
199515, the I.T.U. (International Telecommunications Union) explains how the lack of
co-ordination was the origin of some inconveniences for the users, because of several
reasons. First, the lack of a standard in the transmission means of multimedia content
(CD-ROM, CD-i, Photo CD); second, the diversity of incompatible standards (IBM
PC–compatibles, Apple Macintosh, multimedia Kiosks); and third, the different
codification alternatives (MPC1, MPC2 and MPEG-1). According to the report, these
incompatibilities were the cause that four out of ten products were returned (according
to a study backed by CD-ROM producers), because the users found that their product
did not work. Even though competition among different alternatives can increase the
rate of technological progress in the industry, it must be pointed out that the presence of
many options may provoke delays in the development of the marketco nsumers prefer
to wait rather than betting on the wrong horse. The following example is an application
of the previous considerations to the ICT sectors.
Compatibility issues do matter in the case of the ICT because each part of the
system must dovetail with the other. Nolan (1997) discusses the bottlenecks that
appeared in the development of digital television in Europe, and compares the situation
with the USA. In order to understand the importance of compatibility, he gives a clear
explanation of the different elements involved in the functioning of pay television.
Among these elements, he cites the Electronic Programme Guides (EPG), which are
“the video cousins of the Web browsers such as Netscape and Microsoft Explorer”, and
                                                          
14 Besen and Farrel (1994) have done a very clarifying analysis of compatibility decisions under a
strategic context.
15 Chapter 5, pg. 27.
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the Applications Programming Interface (API) which is the TV counterpart of the
computer operating system. Firms are interested in controlling the API as a way of
establishing barriers to entry. The existence of incompatible receivers and proprietary
APIs is inconvenient for hardware vendors, service providers and consumers, and has
limited the competition in European markets. Moreover, the multiplicity of
incompatible systems has brought about diseconomies of scale, and higher costs have
limited the market acceptance of the products. To illustrate this, he explains how in
Germany all of these factors have had unfortunate consequences (insignificant
penetration levels).
Microsoft, a computer operating systems and software developer, has benefited
from the ubiquity of the Windows operating system in the PC market. The firm is trying
to get the same dominance with the operating system Windows CE in the set-top-box
market.  The reason: control the gate to the nascent digital world. In a pay-TV model,
viewers need a set-top-box to unscramble the signals sent by the broadcasters. These
set-top-boxes have the potential of giving access to a set of sophisticated services, such
as video-on-demand, interactive banking, and so on. Moore and Koprince (1999)
explain Microsoft’s proposal to the cable industry in 1997, and how this firm’s proposal
was finally beaten by TCI’s16. The plan consisted of building a constellation between
the cable and software industries. Microsoft proposed to design a unique set-top-box for
all firms in the constellation, so this became the industry standard and, as a
consequence, the costs of the set-top-boxes would be lower. In this way, Microsoft
would have access to the local loop, and thus to a wide captive market. At the end, the
cable industry did not accept Microsoft’s proposal because of their fear of becoming too
dependent on Microsoft. Instead, they adopted TCI’s alternative plan under which the
cable firms would rely on an open system model. CableLabs, the joint R&D body of
cable companies, formulated a series of specifications for an operating system (API)
that would allow interactivity among different service providers.
We summarize with two lessons that apply to ICT markets. The first one is the
role played by compatibility standards as a response to the initial chaos that rules the
nascent industries; this is the idea of  the “ecosystems” discussed in the Moore and
Koprince (1999) paper. The second one is that the technological superiority of an
alternative is not a guarantee that it will become the paradigm of the market.
3.3. Huge up-front costs and complementary resources
Some innovations require huge investments before the market starts to generate profits.
Because of this, the risk is very high. The initial investment implies a commitment to a
particular technology, and the danger of making the wrong bet is enormous, as there is
no way to go back without sustaining huge costs. The Iridium history is a clarifying
example. Although the project promised a lot, it finally resulted a fiasco because, during
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its development, a competing technology that had a wider acceptance appeared. Another
example comes from the ADSL versus cable battle. There is no way to tell whether one
or the other will end up as a de facto standard and, of course, there is also the possibility
that a third competing technology will emerge and take that role. Discontinuous
innovations can change the leadership in an industry (Foster, 1988); that is, former
followers or even start-ups become leaders and the other way round. Foster (1988) gives
some examples, and concentrates on what he calls the technological myopia–
overinvesting in an obsolete technology. We think this risk is very important in the ICT
sectors.
In providing broadband (with full interactivity) to home consumers, cable
companies and TOs must invest large amounts in infrastructures. This large investments
give rise to economies of scale, an will be finally profitable only if the market is big
enough. In Table 3 we present an estimate of the cost that cable and telephone operators
would have to face if they had to provide broadband to the home market without being
able to use any previous infrastructures.
Medium:
terrestrial wired
Fixed Cost of
the system
Variable Cost
per household
Copper pairs
(telephone)
Analogue
Modems
0 ‹$200
(to 56 kilobits
per second)
Digital Subscriber $1,000+ $600
Line (xDSL)
Cable 0 Negligible
Television
Conventional 60 Negligible
Digital modem $500-$1000 + $500
Table 3:Estimated cost to serve serve 100 million household subscribers, each
Source: Owen (1999)
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Imagine that both, a TO and a cable operator upgraded their infrastructures
installing DSL and digital modems respectively, and they had to spend about the same
amount ($1000 per house).  In this case, the lower average fixed cost would be for a 100
percent of the market (100 million households), but if the penetration rate declines to
the 50 percent the average fixed cost is doubled. Note that, depending on the size of the
market, the costs vary notably.
In the next section, we present a framework that identifies the factors underlying
the risks in the ICT markets. The framework should be useful to understand the
volatility of the technological firms’ shares. Uncertainties about policies and regulation
interact with uncertainty about demand and technology. In Parker’s (1999) words,
“technological invention is the precondition, but by no means the guarantee, of the
market’s embrace”.
The economic impact of an innovation depends on its diffusion. The diffusion of a
product can be understood as the process of its market adoption. The market adoption is
favoured by the improvement of the product itself (amending problems related to its
functioning) and the creation of a set of complementary products, which may originate
bandwagon effects and accelerate the diffusion process. An instance in the automobile
industry of complementary products (the so-called indirect consumption externalities)
would be the existence of a repair and maintenance network as well as a gasoline station
network. In the home provision of broadband services, the shortage of contents has been
viewed as a bottleneck for the development of some markets (pay television17).
Shurner (1997) studies pay TV services in the UK. In his opinion, there are some
drivers that should be taken into account when making considerations about the
encouragement of the pay TV UK market18, namely:
(a) The enlargement of the programming choice, which would give rise to more
niche-content seeking.
(b) The development of the video-on-demand (VOD) or near video-on-demand
(NOVD) services.
(c) Enabling new interactive television services, such as home-shopping, home-
banking and other narrowband interactive services through the television set.
The development of those services requires the engagement of important sums by
those who have to adapt the equipment in order to digitalize the information (contents).
But many problems must yet be solved. Relating to the first driver commented above,
the European Commission highlights the importance of the fragmentation of the
languages and cultures in the European Union. This is a big problem, since the critical
mass needed in order to recoup costs may be more difficult to reach than in a more
homogeneous market like the USA. Considering the expansion of digital contents, the
European Commission observes, in his Green Paper of 1997, that the Intellectual
Property Rights are not protected enough, essentially in the off-line delivery format. If
                                                          
17 The pay TV can be analog and digital.
18 The HDTV is seen as the broadcasters as their ace to combat the telecommunications and cable
industry. It is widely argued, the reader can find some notes in Shurner’s article as well as in Nollan’s,
that the great advantage of HDTV for consumers would be the interactivity (not the increase in quality of
pictures).  It is for this reason that the drivers of HDTV are included here.
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in the TV world content providers were worried about illegal copies made on tape,
nowadays this fear has extended to the online world (the case of Napster is an example).
In spite of that fact, content providers view the “digital” world as a way to resell their
old films in  digital format (as happened with music and Compact Discs). But they are
not likely to unleash their productions without adequate copyright protections.
Regarding the development of VOD or NOVD services in order to encourage demand,
it is not immediate to conclude that upgrading the pipes will boost the market; it could
happen that storage facilities (the DVD, for instance) became the “natural” delivery
method for VOD. And relating to the third driver considered by Shurner (1997), we
think that remote online services (shopping, banking, learning) are still in their infancy.
There are a lot of inhibitors still, about which we comment on the next section.  Even
so, it is clear that the convergence must be a supply driven phenomenon.
4. Users’ attitudes versus the Information Society: ready for
convergence?
In this section, we briefly consider technological convergence from the point of view of
its adoption by the end users. We want to stress two main facts: on the one hand, the
current percentage of home Internet users is still quite low; on the other hand, most
people who do not use the Internet are not interested in doing so.
Traditionally, conventional television has occupied the central place in the sitting
room of peoples’ homes. The consumption experience of the traditional television
consists of passively absorbing a set of pre-selected packages of programmes. The
technological convergence implies that viewers change their appreciation of the
television and become more active. The challenge for telecommunications and cable
firms is to have the ability to change consumers’ attitudes. This seems easy to achieve
with teenagers used to PC or console video games, but it is not so for older generations.
Interactive television, for instance, could be compared to browsing on the World Wide
Web, because the consumer must choose from thousands of web pages instead of
absorbing whatever happens to be available on the screen. For this reason, it would be
clarifying to understand the demand drivers of the Internet, understood as a preliminary
indicator of interactivity acceptance by end-consumers.
Technological convergence can be viewed as the application of the Internet
philosophy to the current TV markets. Though some studies view the Internet as a direct
competitor of the TV in the broadcasting of video, in this paper we consider the Internet
a precursor of what the TV might become in the future. For this reason, in this section
we comment on some studies about the Internet. One of our conclusions is that some
reports about the Information Society are overly optimistic. For instance, according to
research conducted by NUA in 2000,19 62% of the US Internet users would rather
browse the Internet during part of the time they spend watching TV. This seems to
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20
indicate that it will not be long before the Internet becomes dominant in the home
markets. But we should bear in mind that the percentage of Internet home users is still
low, mostly in countries other than the US. For instance, in Europe the percentage of
homes with a connection to the Internet in 2000 was only 18% (INRA, 2000).
Furthermore, the Internet is mainly used to send mails, chat, and get information, in
addition to playing online games; the latter application is closer to technological
convergence, while the former ones are more traditional.
1 No need to do such tasks within the home 55
2 Too expensive 24.2
3 No need to do such tasks within job 22.7
4 Insufficient equipment 21.5
5 Too complicated 18.2
6  Lack of knowledge about the subject area 13.7
7 Lack of interest in new technologies 13
8 Lack of time to use 9.7
9 Fear of security when conducting financial Transactions over the Internet
make me feel uneasy
9.1
10 Other reasons 8
11 Lack of time to learn how to use 7.2
12  No prior knowledge about service / product 6.5
13 Service did not exist in country 2.5
14 Partner uninterested in services 2.1
15 N.S.P./does not know 6.6
Table 4 : Reasons for the lack of interest in services over the Internet throughout
the European Union
Source: Eurobarometer 50.1 Report.
Most studies on the Information Society warn about some critical issues: the
availability of contents, the reliability of the payment systems, the simplicity of the
users’ interface, and the broadband infrastructures. But it is worth pointing that these
factors can do little by themselves. But the potential consumers’ attitudes are also very
important for the creation of the new markets: marketing actions by the firms should
help in transforming needs into wants, and the different offerings must fit into the
interests and goals of the consumers. Table 4 describes the responses got from a sample
of EU citizens when  asked about their lack of interest in services over the Internet. The
responses show those consumers felt little need of Internet services, viewed their prices
as too high, and did not own the necessary equipment. These findings might be
interpreted as discouraging, if prior needs are viewed as a necessary requirement to
motivate consumers.
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5. Key determinants of the firms’ strategies
To understand the main motivations behind the strategies of the firms in the ICT
markets, it will be convenient to establish a parallel with the retailing markets. A look at
the evolution of retailing in the twentieth century reveals a pattern of increasing market
dominance by big firms that are located at the last step in the vertical chain, that is,
those directly serving the consumers. Actually, there has been a shift in market power
from producers to big retailers, who nowadays can impose stringent conditions even on
large producers. This process can shed light on what is happening in the ICT markets.
We can better understand the strategic moves of the firms from this perspective: if direct
access to the markets is so important in the retailing industry, why should it not be so in
the ICT sectors?
Securing access to the market can be a way of protecting the distribution of
content. For instance, let us consider the merger between Time Warner and AOL20.
AOL contributed twenty-three million paying Internet subscribers, and Time-Warner 13
million cable subscribers. The newly created company has a diversified portfolio of
distribution assets and thus a wide variety of delivery options in the local loop. The
merger can be better understood if we make a very simple scenario approach. The first
scenario consists of one particular technology (cable, for instance) ending up by being
clearly superior to any alternative; in this case, those who have stakes in the
predominant technology will find themselves in a much better competitive position. For
this reason, companies are trying to diversify their asset portfolio. The second scenario,
which is, according to some, the most plausible in the long term, is that several of the
delivery technologies end up by being close substitutes. In this case, owning the rights
to content may prove decisive, because the delivery sectors would be more competitive.
To forestall such a situation, firms would like to have stakes in the sectors that own the
contents.
The discussion of the last case is interesting, because it helps us understand the
limits of the parallel with the retailing markets. If several of the delivery technologies
end up by being close substitutes, then it will be the firms that own the content those
that will be in a better competitive position. It is for this reason that, in addition to
having direct access to the consumers, firms are also interested in having access to the
content creation sectors.
Let us discuss a further case, in which a firm is trying to establish a strong
position starting from its dominance in the content markets. Bertelsmann is nowadays
the biggest English-language publisheri ts core strength lies in books and magazines
(Spencer et al, 2000). That is, Bertelsmann’s traditional focus has been content rather
than distribution. Via a series of mergers and acquisitions of Internet-related firms, it is
trying to consolidate its access to the distribution markets. It established joint ventures
                                                          
20 The portfolio of the new corporation includes: content (print content, movies, music, television and
digital films), pipes (deals with regional Bells for DSL service and Time Warner Cable), satellite (AOL
shares in DirecTV), and Internet service.
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with the Internet portals AOL and Lycos to sell its contents. In order to have a foothold
in the on-line book retailing industry, it bought stakes in Barnes & Noble  (to compete
with Amazon in the US), and launched BOL (Bertelsmann On Line) in Europe and
Asia. Its last acquisition, Napster21, has given Bertelsmann access to the thirty eight
million users of the portal and its technology, with the idea of converting it into a
subscription-based download service for any kind of good that can be digitzed.
But the Internet is not the only focus in Bertelsmann's strategy. The firm
announced in April 2000 the creation of a joint venture with Pearson and Frère with the
intention of becoming the biggest TV conglomerate in Europe, capable of disputing the
world markets to their US rivals, such as Time Warner, Walt Disney, and Seagram. The
new consortium was publicized as a way to link complementary assets and get
advantage of synergies in content production (Pearson’s lowbrow production) and
television (CLT-UFA) and radio broadcasting (Stanley, 2000).
There is a wide diversity of firms that intervene in the ICT sectors, from telephone
operators to cable companies or Internet portals. The parallel we have established with
the retailing markets can help us understand a basic motivation of how these firms
prepare for the future competitive situation: all of them try to be the last link in the
chain that gets to the consumers. More precisely, they try to be the window through
which the consumers access the networking services. An Internet portal like Yahoo22
provides a wide variety of services, like e-mail, messagerie, auctions, and access to
online shopping. But a similar intention and interface is supplied by a telephone
operator giving access to the net, though Yahoo and a telephone operator are so
different in every respect. Concluding, firms try to establish themselves not only as the
last link to the consumers, but also as the window through which the consumers will
access all the other servicest his is what can ultimately give them a decisive
competitive advantage.
Let us now consider economic factors behind the process of mergers and alliances
that is taking place, resulting in an important move towards vertical integration. On the
one hand, technological uncertainty favours less integrated forms of co-operation,
because then the risks are spread among more firms; in this case, it is important to agree
upon standards, so as to decrease the market risks. An instance of this is the agreement
about the GSM and WAP standards. On the other hand, market uncertainty favours
more integrated organizational forms, because the difficulty in foreseeing all relevant
contingencies originates high transaction costs. The merger between AOL and Time
Warner illustrates this case. Obviously, the existence of economies of scale is another
factor which favours integration.
                                                          
21 Originally, an Internet portal that allowed the exchange of  music among its users.
22 Which started off as an Internet search engine.
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6. Conclusions
For the analysis of firms behaviour we have examined the process of technological
convergence that is taking place in the Information and Communication Technologies
(ICT) sectors. This process implies that some markets will disappear to give rise to new
ones. We have taken in consideration in some details the technological and economic
factors that play a role in the process. In the first place, we make a revision of the
different alternatives coming from different sectors at  least until the convergence was
possible that are grappling for getting the market. At the moment, neither of the
transmission media nor terminal is completely capable of displaying all kind of data in a
“convenient” way, and that means to commit large sums of money to enhance
infrastructures. In such a situation, predictions about the likely size of the market and its
momentum becomes crucial in order to evaluate the potential gains or losses of the
project, but when the product is so novel it is difficult to judge consumer’s reaction to it.
Developing a competitive advantage implies to anticipate an unarticulated market,
select core capabilities and bet on a particular technology. In a context where it is
difficult to asses whether there will be a “winner” technology or all of them will become
perfect substitutes it is difficult to predict whether contents or delivery will prove more
decisive. The examples we have surveyed suggest that firms diversify their portfolio
assets defensively and integrate backwards to avoid the foreclosure of  some content.
 Much of the thrust of this paper has been concerned with suggesting how these
technological and market uncertainties is shaping firms’ strategies. One of our main
conclusions is that a key element in the firms’ strategies is to be the window through
which the consumers access the market. We have briefly discussed the process of
mergers and alliances that is taking place. An interesting question that deserves further
research is the establishment of a taxonomy of the different organizational forms that
have appeared, together with an evaluation of the transaction costs involved in each
case.
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